The light that makes other things intelligible
The one created thing which we cannot look at is the one thing in the light of which we look at everything.
The sun functions as a condition of seeing rather than simply another object to be inspected. A useful philosophical comparison is Plato's Republic VI, 508b–e: the sun makes vision possible, while the Good makes knowledge possible. The relation between light and visible things becomes a model for the relation between an ultimate principle and intelligibility. Plato, Republic, 508b–e.
But Chesterton changes the emphasis. Plato expressly says that the sun, although the cause of vision, can itself be seen; Chesterton stresses the dazzling source that cannot be looked at directly. His mystery is fruitful because it illuminates ordinary experience without first becoming completely transparent to analysis. This is a comparison of argumentative structures, not evidence that he borrowed the image from Plato. It also helps explain the opening concession about symbols: the image offers a way to apprehend his position, rather than a demonstration that mysticism is true.
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