# The light that makes other things intelligible

Commentary on Orthodoxy by G. K. Chesterton.

On [CH02.P020](https://glosses.org/orthodoxy/pg16769-r1/CH02.P020/#char=189,296): "The one created thing which we cannot look at is the one thing in the light of which we look at everything."

The sun functions as a condition of seeing rather than simply another object to be inspected. A useful philosophical comparison is Plato's *Republic* VI, 508b–e: the sun makes vision possible, while the Good makes knowledge possible. The relation between light and visible things becomes a model for the relation between an ultimate principle and intelligibility. [Plato, *Republic*, 508b–e](https://atlas.perseus.tufts.edu/library/passage/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg030.perseus-eng2:6.508/).

But Chesterton changes the emphasis. Plato expressly says that the sun, although the cause of vision, can itself be seen; Chesterton stresses the dazzling source that cannot be looked at directly. His mystery is fruitful because it illuminates ordinary experience without first becoming completely transparent to analysis. This is a comparison of argumentative structures, not evidence that he borrowed the image from Plato. It also helps explain the opening concession about symbols: the image offers a way to apprehend his position, rather than a demonstration that mysticism is true.

## Sources

- [Plato, Republic, Paul Shorey translation, Perseus/Scaife ATLAS digital witness](https://atlas.perseus.tufts.edu/library/passage/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg030.perseus-eng2:6.508/), VI, 508b–e; especially the sun as visible cause of sight at 508b and the Good as cause of knowledge at 508e

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