When belief is a condition of the evidence
If faith is one of the conditions, those without faith have a most healthy right to laugh. But they have no right to judge.
The conditional matters: Chesterton is defending the eligibility of testimony produced under faith, rather than demonstrating that faith really produces miracles. A close contemporary comparison is William James's ‘The Will to Believe’ (first published June 1896; inspected in the 1912 Longmans impression of the 1897 collection). In section IX, James argues that trust can help bring about friendship and cooperation; withholding it until proof arrives may prevent the very evidence one demands. Section X extends this possibility to a personal religious universe in which evidence might require an initial response from the inquirer. This is a comparison of arguments, not evidence of borrowing. James, §§IX–X, pp. 23–29.
Chesterton's angry witnesses sharpen a distinction the analogy also leaves unresolved. Their testimony may establish that anger is accompanied by a certain visual experience; it would not by itself establish that a crimson cloud exists outside their perception. Likewise, allowing believers to testify to visions does not yet decide whether the visions disclose an independent spiritual object. The paragraph successfully challenges dismissal solely because a witness was a believer. Its stronger exclusion of unbelievers from judgment needs an additional argument: an investigator can take the proposed condition seriously while still asking whether expectation, error, or an external cause best explains the report.
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