Distrusting rulers without a doctrine of inherited sin
the only logical negation of oligarchy was in the affirmation of original sin
The political force of the sentence lies in refusing any ruling group an exemption from human moral weakness. But the word ‘only’ goes beyond the proposition that such weakness justifies restraints on power. The Federalist, no. 51 (1788), offers a useful comparison: because rulers share the imperfections of the ruled, government must control itself as well as its subjects. Its remedy combines dependence on the people with institutions that make rival ambitions check one another. Federalist 51, paragraphs beginning ‘But the great security’ through ‘We see it particularly displayed’.
That argument can be stated without premises about Adam, inherited guilt, or the theological origin of human weakness. This is a distinction between arguments, not proof that the essay's author lacked Christian convictions or that Chesterton borrowed from him. The comparison also exposes a further consequence of universal fallibility: no. 51 requires safeguards against injustice by popular majorities as well as by rulers. Chesterton's anti-oligarchic application is thus one use of a wider principle of distrust. To establish the exclusive necessity claimed here, one would additionally have to show why an account of ordinary self-interest could not supply the same political reason.
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