A materialist cosmology does not mean a grasping character
"materialist" as a term of cosmology with "materialist" as a moral taunt
The distinction protects an opponent from a verbal shortcut: a claim about what the universe consists of cannot simply be substituted for an accusation of selfishness or devotion to possessions. William James offers a close contemporary comparison in Pragmatism (first published 1907), Lecture III. In the inspected Project Gutenberg text, his discussion moves from an acquaintance's dismissive name for materialism to Herbert Spencer's reply that scientific matter is extraordinarily subtle. James rejects mere disgust at matter as an argument. His own objection concerns whether the universe ultimately preserves human ideals. This is a useful distinction for reading Chesterton: one can reject a cosmology for an argued consequence without maligning the character of its adherents. No direct borrowing is established.
There is a further distinction within the supposedly scientific camp. In On the Physical Basis of Life, delivered in 1868 and published in 1869, T. H. Huxley distinguished materialistic scientific terminology from materialism as a philosophy. The inspected Collected Essays, volume I, transcription includes his later notes. At pages 154–55 he accepts molecular explanations of life and thought while expressly rejecting the materialist designation; at pages 161–64 he argues that observed regularity does not establish metaphysical necessity and affirms the practical efficacy of volition. Huxley therefore illustrates why even the phrase 'scientific materialists' requires care. Scientific explanation, a complete metaphysical doctrine and a person's moral character are three questions, not one. This comparison qualifies the category Chesterton uses without claiming that Huxley was the unnamed complainant he had in mind.
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