Dream doubt and the decision to burn London
no proof can be offered that might not be offered in a dream
The dream hypothesis challenges the credentials of experience: another apparent experience cannot simply certify that the earlier one was waking. A useful comparison is Descartes's Meditations (1641). In the First Meditation, he moves from examples of delusion to the difficulty of distinguishing waking from dreaming. Yet he explicitly confines the exercise to knowledge rather than action. In the Sixth Meditation he argues that waking experiences connect through memory with the rest of one's life, unlike dreams; his final assurance also invokes God's non-deceptiveness. See Meditations I and VI, Ian Johnston's 2012 translation, paragraphs beginning “How often have I had an experience,” “For I know that doing this,” and “And I ought to dismiss.”
Chesterton's incendiary therefore adds a practical commitment that the sceptical argument alone does not supply. Doubting that one can conclusively prove oneself awake does not require confidence that destruction will be harmless or that breakfast will terminate the experience. His example tests a philosophy adopted as a rule for living; it does not refute every philosophical use of dream doubt. The contrast clarifies his stated distinction between theoretical completeness and practical failure. Descartes is a comparison here, not an identified direct target or demonstrated source.
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