Darwin's moral psychology exceeds the two extremes
On the evolutionary basis you may be inhumane, or you may be absurdly humane; but you cannot be human.
Darwin's own account contains more intermediate machinery than this dilemma admits. The Descent of Man first appeared in 1871; the edition inspected here is the second (1874), chapter IV. Its explanation of conscience combines social instincts with memory, developed intelligence, communal judgment and habit. Kinship is therefore not its sole instruction for conduct. Darwin also distinguishes an action's motive from its standard: an impulsive rescue need not be motivated by an expectation of pleasure, while communal welfare can serve as a proposed standard of morality.
His counterfactual example of human beings raised under hive-bee conditions is particularly revealing. They might acquire consciences sanctioning actions humans ordinarily condemn. Darwin thus acknowledges that an evolved conscience need not reproduce our particular rules; he is not recommending that people imitate whichever animal supplies an arresting example. This complicates Chesterton's claim that evolutionary thinking offers only cruelty or indiscriminate tenderness. Whether Darwin's account ultimately justifies the authority of its proposed standard remains a separate question; identifying a differentiated moral psychology does not settle it. Darwin, chapter IV, opening propositions, hive-bee example, and Concluding Remarks.
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