A conditional objection, not a recovered quotation from Suthers
Obviously if any actions, even a lunatic's, can be causeless, determinism is done for.
The logical objection depends on what Suthers actually conceded. Chesterton reports him in indirect speech, rather than quoting an identified article. If Suthers admitted that actual actions by mentally ill people escape all causation, Chesterton's objection would defeat a universal causal determinism. But if Suthers meant that free will would require causeless action, and called such a hypothetical freedom lunacy, he need not have admitted any actual exception. Without the original article, the alleged contradiction cannot be independently verified. The wording here supports this distinction between an assertion of causeless events and a rejection of their possibility; it does not settle which position Suthers held. The inspected witness is the John Lane 1909 printing, chapter II, pp. 28–30; Orthodoxy first appeared in 1908, as the publication history preserved in Gutenberg's later-printing transcription records. 1909 witness; publication history.
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