Humility need not mean small ambitions
Humility was largely meant as a restraint upon the arrogance and infinity of the appetite of man.
Aquinas offers a useful theological distinction here. In Summa theologiae II–II, question 161, article 1, humility restrains aspirations that exceed right reason, while magnanimity encourages the pursuit of great things against despair. The two virtues cooperate rather than cancel each other. Article 2 locates humility principally in the appetite, with knowledge of one's limitations guiding it. That is a close conceptual parallel to Chesterton's language of restrained appetite. Aquinas, II–II, q.161, aa.1–2.
The qualification matters: Aquinas does not commend indiscriminate self-belittlement, and Chesterton explicitly limits himself to one aspect of humility. His account of enjoying enormous imaginative objects supplies a psychological extension of the distinction, rather than Aquinas's own argument. Humility can enlarge what someone attempts or appreciates without inflating that person's estimate of personal entitlement. No direct borrowing is established. The inspected translation is the English Dominican Fathers' second revised edition (1920), reproduced by New Advent; the medieval work's first complete printed edition appeared at Basel in 1485. Translation statement; publication history.
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