Repetition without a proof of necessity
no proof of this unavoidable repetition in things except the fact that the things were repeated
The objection has a close philosophical parallel in Hume's Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (first published 1748; inspected in the edited digital text at Hume Texts Online, which identifies its witnesses as 1748 and 1777). In section IV, paragraphs 18–21, Hume argues that a changed course of nature involves no contradiction, while using past experience to prove future uniformity already assumes the uniformity being defended. Observed recurrence and demonstrated necessity are different claims. This is a comparison of arguments, not evidence that Chesterton borrowed from Hume.
But their accounts of the resulting experience diverge. Section V, paragraphs 4–6, makes repeated conjunction generate expectation through custom; this mechanism enables ordinary action despite the missing proof. Chesterton instead dramatizes recurrence making the familiar stranger: one peculiar nose is accidental, seven suggest intention. His explicit qualification, 'I speak here only of an emotion,' matters. The paragraph describes the awakening of an interpretation, not a deduction of a designer from induction's difficulty. Its last sentence prepares the following paragraphs' proposal that repetition might express personal delight.
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