Permission to believe and reasons for disbelief
his is really much more of a pure veto than mine
The comparison turns on the scope of a prohibition: some necessary processes can coexist with Christianity, whereas even one genuinely nonmaterial spirit would contradict an exclusively material universe. That establishes an asymmetry between the positions' contents; it does not establish that every rejection of a spirit is imposed before evidence is considered. A theory admitting more possibilities need not be better supported.
McCabe's later Is Spiritualism Based on Fraud? (1920), inspected in Project Gutenberg's transcription of the Watts edition, supplies a useful qualification. In its preface, pp. iii–v, he distinguishes the consolation Spiritualism offers from its truth, then identifies the extent of fraud as an empirical question. His stated procedure is examination of testimony and alleged phenomena. This is evidence of how McCabe presented his method, not proof that he always applied it impartially. Nor is this later debate with Conan Doyle an identified reply to Orthodoxy. It nevertheless prevents us from treating Chesterton's image of a forbidden imp as a sufficient account of McCabe's reasons for disbelief.
Sources
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