# Hume's reason survives its own sceptical argument

Commentary on Orthodoxy by G. K. Chesterton.

On [CH03.P008](https://glosses.org/orthodoxy/pg16769-r1/CH03.P008/#char=946,978): "I have no right to think at all."

Hume had already explored the prospect of reason undermining itself in *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Books I–II first published 1739). In I.iv.1 he imagines successive checks on the reliability of judgment, each introducing a further possibility of error until confidence disappears. Yet he immediately denies that anyone constantly lives in that condition: natural belief keeps people judging, thinking and reasoning. The [section](https://davidhume.org/texts/t/1/4/1) thus separates the logical pressure of sceptical reflection from its practical power.

This comparison clarifies the force and limit of Chesterton's conclusion. His sceptic loses the *right* to think: the issue is justification. Hume agrees that reasoning cannot simply supply an independent guarantee of all its own operations, but denies that this stops their exercise. Chesterton treats a radical loss of warrant as a peril requiring protection; Hume presents our natural constitution as already preventing sustained paralysis. Their overlap is the problem of reason examining its own credentials, not an agreed remedy or evidence of direct influence.

## Sources

- [David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, I.iv.1, Of scepticism with regard to reason](https://davidhume.org/texts/t/1/4/1), Hume Texts Online, edited online text; T 1.4.1.1–8 and 12, SBN 180–184, 186–187

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